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Abstract
This paper aims to assess the Papuan government’s policy for preventing the spread of COVID-19 
through the shutdown of travel to the region based on the Papua joint statement. Excluding 
the transportation of goods, Papua was the first province in Indonesia to restrict entry into the 
region by both sea and air travel. To analyse the Papuan government’s policy, Edwards’ theory 
of policy implementation was adopted. Using first-hand interviews, observations, and library 
research, this paper argues that the government of Papua has made the right decision to close 
its borders, despite challenges, as part of a strict policy to protect the region from COVID-19. It 
is also worth noting that although five regions selected for this study (Jayapura City, Mimika, 
Biak Numfor, Merauke and Yapen Regency) reflected variations between one another in policy 
implementation, they all had expressed how the local government in Papua was doing the best 
they could to eradicate COVID-19. The use of theoretical frameworks (communication, resources, 
dispositions, and bureaucratic structures) as part of policy implementation had also been effective, 
despite that some parts need to be improved. The results of this study include recommendations 
for effective coordination among policymakers, the availability of laboratory testing, adoption of 
evidence-based policies and improving the health system in Papua. 
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Introduction
The world is currently experiencing 
unprecedented challenges from Coronavirus– 
commonly known as ‘COVID-19’– that is 
affecting communities and governments all 
over the world. The first case of the COVID-19 
was found in Wuhan City, China and reported 
by Dr. Li Wen Liang via social media –through 
his uploads to Weibo and WeChat – on 30 
December 2019 (Hua & Shaw, 2020; Yang et 
al., 2020)which started in Wuhan in China in 
early December 2019, brought into the notice of 
the authorities in late December, early January 
2020, and, after investigation, was declared 
as an emergency in the third week of January 
2020. The WHO declared this as Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC. 
At that time, he warned his fellow medics to 
be careful in dealing with mysterious new 
diseases (COVID-19). Due to his upload, on 
January 3 Liang dealt with the local police who 
later forced him to apologize for “making false 
comments” on the internet (Zhu, 2020). Even 
though Liang was infected with the COVID-19 
and subsequently died in February 2020, most 
people considered him a whistle-blower who 
helped raise awareness of COVID-19 cases to 
the public sphere (Enos, 2020; “Li Wenliang”, 
2020). On 11 March 2020, WHO officially 
declared the COVID-19 outbreak a global 
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pandemic and this was followed by reports of 
confirmed cases from a number of countries 
(Ducharme, 2020.)
In Indonesia, President Jokowi officially 
announced details about two Indonesians who 
had tested positive for novel COVID-19 on 2 
March 2020. President Jokowi stated that the 
two people (a 64-year-old and her 31-year-
old daughter) had directly interacted with 
a Japanese citizen who had tested positive 
in Malaysia after visiting Indonesia in early 
February (Gorbiano, 2020). Almuttaqi (2020) 
observed that these two people apparently 
found out about their positive test results after 
listening to the announcement issued by the 
President in the public news; prior to direct 
notifications sent by the health workers. On 
15 March, President Jokowi called for ‘social 
distancing’ through the reduction of out-of-
home activities, “…It’s time for us to work from 
home, to learn from home, and to worship at 
home” (Purnamasari, 2020). The purpose of 
the announcement was to not only enable the 
government to reduce transmission but also 
maintain safety and protection in the midst 
of COVID-19. Since the first announcement 
of infected cases in early March, the number 
of confirmed COVID-19 positive cases has 
increased significantly. As of 23 March, there 
have been a total of 579 cases, 49 dead and 30 
recovering  (“Update Corona 23 Maret”, 2020).
On 24 March, as the central government 
still called for social distancing, the governor 
of Papua, Lukas Enembe, released a joint 
statement in consultation with Forkopimda 
(a regional leadership coordination forum), 
regents/mayors and several other stakeholders 
(Surat Gubernur Papua, 2020). The statement 
expanded on the central government’s social 
distancing policy by advising the Minister 
of transportation in Jakarta that entry into 
the region by both sea and air travel would 
be restricted, excluding the transportation 
of goods. Papua became the first province in 
Indonesia to close its borders to prevent the 
spread of COVID-19 to the region, coming 
into effect on 26 March 2020 (Dzulfaroh, 2020; 
Koran Fajar Indonesia, 2020). This decision was 
later followed by Tegal (30 March 2020) and 
Tasikmalaya (31 March 2020). Such response 
implies that the local government understands 
the character of the region very well and is 
aware of what decisions are best for the region. 
Papua needed more than just social distancing, 
thereby closing the travel for a while was 
required. In this context, Papua could become 
an example of how a local government highly 
prioritized the safety of its citizens and adopted 
stricter COVID-19 policies than the central 
government.  
Korwa (2020) argued that the policy 
can be seen as a means of protection for the 
people of Papua, particularly indigenous 
ones. It also expressed distrust in the central 
government’s ability to suppress human-to-
human transmission of COVID-19, which 
was crucial considering the unpreparedness 
of health facilities in the region. Although 
Governor Enembe had said that the joint 
statement only limited the movement of people, 
his decision was contrary to the instructions of 
the central government (Mawel & Mambor, 
2020; Nugraheny, 2020). It became a matter of 
concern because decisions on social restrictions 
in a region, including closing travel, were the 
authority of the central government; not the 
province – and in this case, it was the Minister 
who administers government affairs in the health 
sector as stipulated in Government Regulation 
Number 21 of 2020 Article 2 paragraph 1. 
Accordingly, this topic becomes interesting for 
further study. There have been many articles 
related to dealing with COVID-19 at the national 
level (Apresian, 2020; Martha, 2020; Morfi et 
al., 2020; Pakpahan, 2020; Telaumbanua, 2020; 
Widaningrum, & Mas’udi, 2020), however, 
many of these authorities are not paying 
specifically focused attention towards the events 
at a regional level, including in Papua. Therefore, 
this article will try to fill this gap.
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This paper argues that the government 
of Papua has made the right decision to close 
its borders, albeit facing challenges, as part 
of a strict policy to protect the region from 
COVID-19. It also maintains that although 
five regions selected for this study (Jayapura 
City, Mimika, Biak Numfor, Merauke and 
Yapen Regency) reflected variations between 
each other in policy implementation, they all 
had expressed how the local government in 
Papua was doing the best they could to combat 
COVID-19. The paper is structured as follows: 
first, it presents the theoretical debates to justify 
the use of a theory to analyse the policy. Second, 
it explains the methods used including primary 
and secondary data. Third, it documents 
the results obtained in several sub-sections 
(identification of policies, current conditions, 
and the impacts). Fourth, it examines the 
Papuan government’s policy which focuses on 
breaking the chain of COVID-19 transmissions. 
To do that, a theory developed by Edwards will 
be used. The final section provides conclusions 
and suggestions.
Theoretical Debates 
Edwards and Sharkansky (1978, p.2) 
defined public policy as “What governments 
say and do, or do not do... It is goals or purposes 
of government programs... The important 
ingredients of programs... The implementation 
of intention and rules.” Edwards (1980) in 
his book Implementing Public Policy builds on 
this definition, focusing on how to specify 
prerequisites for policy success as well as 
identifying barriers to successful policy 
implementation. In doing so, Edwards proposed 
four variables to analyze the implementation 
of a policy: communication, resources, 
dispositions or attitudes, and bureaucratic 
structures. Effective communication is vitally 
important to make sure the instruction is 
clearly understood by the person who will then 
carry out the orders. “Orders to implement 
policies must be transmitted to the appropriate 
personnel, and they must be clear, accurate and 
consistent”(Edwards, 1980, p.10). Resources also 
play a pivotal role in ensuring that implementers 
are capable of implementing effective policies. 
The disposition or attitude is conceived 
as a commitment of implementers to pursue 
policies. “If implementation is to proceed 
effectively not only must implementers know 
what to do and have the capability to do it, but 
they must also desire to carry out a policy” 
(Edwards, 1980, p.11). Last but not least, 
bureaucratic structures can also influence the 
way in which policies are conducted. In this 
context, Edwards focused on two elements 
of the bureaucracy of the administration, 
which are Standard Operational Procedure 
(SOP) – a guideline containing written 
instructions to carry out work in accordance 
with administrative functions and processes; 
and fragmentation – an effort to divide the 
responsibility of a policy into several different 
work units in order to improve services. 
The interpretation of Thomas R. Dye 
(1978, p. 3) is slightly different from that of 
Edwards and Sharkansky, public policy as 
whatever governments choose to do or not to 
do. While acknowledging the government’s 
role in constituting public policy options, Dye 
underlined the importance of looking at actions 
that the government may not have taken. 
This becomes crucial because, in the context 
of public policy, inaction is an action as well, 
and that could have far-reaching implications 
in public opinion (Oni, 2016). On the other 
hand, Robert T. Nakamura and Smallwood 
(1980, p. 31) argued that public policy should 
consider three environments: the formulation 
environment, implementation environment, 
and evaluation environment. They believe that 
these three environments would explore the 
ways and the purposes in order to shed light 
on the instructions given by decision-makers 
as well as the policy implementation process. 
The policy implementation environment 
is comprised of several actors, yet the type of 
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policy should be taken into account. These actors 
include policymakers, formal implementers, 
intermediaries, lobbies and constituency groups, 
recipients and consumers of policies, the media, 
and evaluators. Nakamura and Smallwood 
also maintained the links between these three 
environments through communication and 
compliance. Communication would make 
policy formulation and policy implementation 
work better. Indeed, if communication were 
ineffective, it would lead to implementation 
failure. Meanwhile, the policy evaluation 
environment included those who engage in 
planning, projections, oversight, or monitoring 
activities (Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980).
Figure 1. 
Edwards: Defining variables 
of policy implementation
Source: Edwards (1980, p. 148) 
Edwards’ approach is the most relevant 
to the aims of this study, given the emphasis it 
places on assessing the policy implementation 
in regards to Papua’s handling of the COVID-19 
pandemic. Although Dye (1978) reminds us 
about considering inaction the government 
could take, it may not work in this context 
because the Papuan government already 
formulated its policy as a response to the 
issue. The three environments (the formulation 
environment, implementation environment, 
and evaluation environment) proposed by 
Nakamura and Smallwood in relation to policy 
implementation also seems not to fit Papuan 
context. This approach tends to emphasize 
the role of actors (policymakers and policy 
implementers) as well as communication and 
compliance, while ignoring the importance 
of other aspects. Understanding Papua in 
the context of handling COVID-19 requires 
a comprehensive approach, including 
considering other instruments like resources 
and bureaucratic structures. Therefore, 
the frameworks developed by Edwards 
(communication, resources, dispositions or 
attitudes, and bureaucratic structures) are 
highly relevant to assess the implementation 
of the Papuan government’s policy for tackling 
the spread of COVID-19.
Methods 
This study used a qualitative approach. 
Data was collected through three different 
methods, namely interviews, observation, and 
library research. Data was then analysed using 
data reduction, data display, and conclusion 
drawing/verification (Miles & Huberman, 
1994). The researchers conducted interviews 
with a total of 20 respondents from Jayapura 
City, Mimika, Biak Numfor, Merauke and 
Yapen Regency. These five regions were 
selected because of their characteristics of 
COVID-19 transmission and their geography in 
the context of implementing travel restrictions 
to Papua. Merauke was the first regency in 
Papua that confirmed its citizens had tested 
positive for COVID-19. Jayapura city is the 
capital of Papua Province, making it the 
center for business and economy. Mimika, 
the regency where Freeport’s Grasberg mine 
operated, showed frequent travels in and out 
of Papua and recorded the highest number 
of positive cases in Papua as of April 2020. 
Yapen and Biak were picked for geographic 
concerns, both of which were an island making 
them difficult to keep their area away from 
traditional (unofficial) routes of entry. 
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The interviewees were chosen because 
of their knowledge, expertise, and academic 
competency (appropriateness). They were 
classified into three clusters: doctors (10 
people), academics (8 people), and key figures 
(2 people). Doctors were those whose expertise 
and work was related to handling COVID-19, 
while academics include lecturers based in 
Cenderawasih University who had competency 
in the field of public policy, medical science, 
anthropology, public health, and law. Two 
key figures, who hold special positions at the 
national level, were also interviewed in this 
study because of their knowledge and expertise 
to understand Papuan cases, namely Expert 
on Deputy V of the Executive Office of the 
President of Republic of Indonesia, Laus D.C. 
Rumayom; and the Member of Commission 
I of People’s Representative Council of the 
Republic of Indonesia in Electoral District 
Papua, Yan P. Mandenas. The data collected 
from the interviews were transcribed. The 
Papuans interviewed for this study include 13 
males and 7 females. At the time of interview, 
their age ranged between 20 and 30 years (4 
people); between 31 and 40 years (8 people); 
between 41 and 50 years (1 person);  and over 
50 years (7 people). Some interviewees agreed 
to use their real names while others chose to 
use initials only to remain anonymous. 
 This study observed the capital of Papua 
Province, Jayapura City – one of the main 
epicentres of COVID-19 in the region. Library 
research was also utilized to collect secondary 
data in order to strengthen primary data. The 
secondary data collected in this study were 
from various sources: 1) Government website/
Documents: Papua Provincial Government, 
Statistics Indonesia (BPS), The Papua Joint 
Statement (Kesepakatan Bersama Pencegahan, 
Pengendalian, dan Penanggulangan COVID-19 
di Provinsi Papua); Governor’s Letter (Surat 
Gubernur Papua). 2) News (global, national 
and local): WHO, TIME, Kompas, The Jakarta 
Post, BBC News, CNN Indonesia, Tirto, Cepos, 
WHO, Lintas Papua, Antara Papua, Suara 
Papua, Timika Express. 3) Journals related to the 
topic of COVID-19: Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu 
Politik, Jurnal Ilmiah Hubungan Internasional, 
International Journal of Environmental 
Research and Public Health, Journal of 
Indonesian Health and Administration, Journal 
of Chinese Governance. 4) Books related to the 
theoretical debates, explanation methods, and 
COVID-19: Tata Kelola Penanganan COVID-19 
di Indonesia: Kajian awal, Implementing 
Public Policy, The Policy Predicament: Making 
and Implementing Public Policy. This study 
particularly limited the time for data collection 
from 22 March to 30 April 2020 due to the 
ongoing situation with COVID-19 in Papua.
Results 
Results of interviews, observations, and 
library research are documented below as a 
summary of local perspectives in response to 
COVID-19 Papuan policies.
Identification,  Response and Policy 
Controversies to Restricting Access to Papua 
The positive COVID-19 cases in Papua 
Province were first announced on 22 March 
2020 by an acting official of the head of 
Merauke Regency Health Department, Dr. 
Nevile Muskita. He confirmed that two of 
his citizens had tested positive for COVID-19 
after receiving the laboratory test results from 
the National Institute of Health Research 
and Development in Jakarta. The first patient 
had a travel history from regions exposed to 
COVID-19, while the second patient was a 
medical worker who made direct contact with 
the infected patient during examination at the 
Merauke Regional General Hospital (Aditra, 
2020). The confirmation of the COVID-19 
cases in Merauke Regency and the increase 
of people under monitoring (ODP) coming 
from outside Papua had urged the Governor 
of Papua to organize a meeting on Prevention, 
Control and Countermeasures of COVID-19 
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on 24 March 2020. The meeting, chaired by the 
Governor himself and attended by Forkopimda, 
Regents/Mayors, and all stakeholders in 
Papua, released a ‘Joint Statement’ to declare 
the COVID-19 emergency response status by 
expanding on the central government’s social 
distancing policy for 14 days, starting from 26 
March to 9 April 2020. The Papua joint statement 
stipulated six sections with several points. 
One of the most eye-catching sections of the 
statements is to restrict entry into the province 
both through sea and air travel as well as cross-
border posts for a little while– as recorded by 
section 3 point 6 (Hasil Kesepakatan Bersama, 
2020).
The Papua joint statement was fervently 
supported by Dr. Silwanus Sumule – the 
spokesperson for the Papua COVID-19 response 
team. In a video called ‘Don’t Come to Papua in 
14 Days’ published by a local media (“Jangan 
Datang ke Papua dalam 14 Hari”, 2020); he 
asserted “…I knew this could sound harsh 
for certain people but this was the fact; if you 
didn’t want to die, did not come to Papua. Our 
ability to manage the COVID-19 patients were 
very limited in terms of health workers and 
medical infrastructure. There were only seven 
pulmonologists and around 60 ventilators in 
Papua. That’s why you would be better off 
staying in your hometown for a while...” In 
comparison with other interviews by Jakarta 
Post (Mawel & Mambor, 2020) and Tirto 
(Bernie, 2020), Sumule explained that Papua 
only had forty-five hospitals, and fifteen of 
them were recommended as referral hospitals 
for COVID-19 cases. Furthermore, only two 
out of the two hundred total isolation rooms 
across all hospitals in Papua Province met 
World Health Organization (WHO) standards, 
whilst the other one hundred and ninety-eight 
isolation rooms only relied on HEPA filters to 
limit contamination to indoor air. However, 
the Indonesian Minister of Home Affairs, Tito 
Karnavian, disagreed with the Papua joint 
statement to limit access to the region. He stated 
that the policy instructions from the central to 
local government were clear, aiming to prevent 
the transmission of COVID-19 through social/
physical distancing, not by closing travel 
from one region to another. On 26 March, the 
Ministry of Transportation (Directorate General 
of Civil Aviation) also rejected the restricted 
access, arguing that it should have been started 
by evaluation, coordination and socialisation 
(Korwa, 2020).
In contrast to the Ministry of Home 
Affairs and Transportation, the Member of 
Commission I of People’s Representative 
Council of the Republic of Indonesia in 
Electoral District Papua, Yan P. Mandenas (37 
years, male), showed his unwavering support 
for the Papua joint statement to restrict access 
to the region:
 “.. Stayed consistent and continued 
[to put the statement into practice] 
even though there were small protests 
from Jakarta. I thought that the 
Papuan government, in accordance 
with the Health Quarantine Law, 
had taken a step forward to protect 
the entire community in the land 
of Papua, so that the positive 
patients of COVID-19 could be 
treated intensively and properly, 
not to mention the importance 
of  social izat ion.  Community 
quarantine could also be enhanced 
until  the deadline of 14 days 
or perhaps be extended, so the 
transmission did not spread across 
all regencies/city in Papua. This 
step taken by the governor of Papua 
should have been underpinned by 
the central government, thereby 
breaking the chain of COVID-19 
transmission in Papua.” (personal 
communication, 26 March 2020). 
By the same token, Expert on Deputy 
V of the Executive Office of the President of 
Republic of Indonesia, Laus D.C. Rumayom 
(37 years, male) during his visit to the  capital 
of Papua Province also argued: 
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“….It should be underlined that 
the idea of  limiting access to Papua 
was not Mr. Enembe’s personal 
decision, but rather was the result 
from a joint statement in consultation 
with Forkopimda along with other 
stakeholders in Papua including 
Cenderawasih University, the Health 
Department of Papua Province, 
virologists, epidemiologists, medical 
workers and so forth... Hence, there 
was no hidden political agenda with 
the President or the Minister of Home 
Affairs, it was only an analysis of 
the situation based on the nature 
of the virus and how it worked. 
Restricting people to enter Papua 
was an effective strategy at that time; 
imagined if the access had not been 
closed? Perhaps Papua would have 
the highest number of confirmed 
cases due to open access movement 
and the unpreparedness of health 
facilities in the region such as rapid 
tests.”(personal communication, 3 
May 2020).
 
 The medical staff also endorses the 
Governor’s policy through the joint statement 
to limit access to the region. According to the 
interviews with 10 doctors, they all supported 
the policy because it not only helped them 
identify people with travel history from outside 
Papua but it also reduced the positive number 
of COVID-19 cases from outside Papua. Of 
ten doctors, six described the transmission 
of COVID-19 in Papua as ‘imported cases’; 
meaning the virus originated from outside 
Papua and then local transmission occurred. 
One of the medical staff, Dr. Agustinus Udam 
(36 years, male) observed: 
“….If I wasn’t mistaken, there were 
two large clusters that contributed 
to the number of COVID-19 cases 
in Papua Province – they both were 
from religious activities, namely 
cluster GBI (Indonesian Bethel 
Church), where one or several 
participants after attending the 
event in Lembang, West Java then 
went back home and socialized 
with other residents, causing a 
chain of local transmission in Papua 
became inevitable. Next cluster was 
from participants who took part 
in the Ijtima Ulama Gowa event 
in South Sulawesi….” (personal 
communication, 6 May 2020). 
This is also similar to the statement made 
by the Regent of Mimika, Eltinus Omaleng, 
“Initially, COVID-19 did not exist in Mimika 
and Papua. The day before, the GBI Mawar 
Sharon Timika congregation joined an event in 
Lembang; from there the virus spread to Timika 
when they returned home”(Supar, 2020). 
In spite of the support which medical 
staffs give to the Governor and the joint 
statement, other measures should be taken into 
account. According to EF (32 years, female), an 
epidemiologist from the Faculty of Medicine 
Cenderawasih University: 
“even though the policy made 
by Enembe in consultation with 
Forkopimda and other stakeholders 
was great, it still needed to be 
accompanied by more aggressive 
actions such as mass screening 
especially in red zone areas such as 
Mimika Regency and Jayapura City. 
Apart from people under monitoring 
(ODP) and patient under supervision 
(PDP), we needed to focus more on 
asymptomatic person (OTG). These 
people were moving freely from one 
place to another. Despite the fact that 
they could show healthy behavior, 
they were basically sick and had a 
high potential for transmission.” 
(personal communication, 5 May 
2020). 
Indeed, since March 2020 the Ministry of 
Health has revised the COVID-19 Prevention 
and Control Guidelines by adding categories 
of groups of people without symptoms (Adhi, 
2020).
55
Johni R. V. Korwa, Diego R. De Fretes, Meyland S. F. Wambrauw, Jackson Yumame, Christine O. I. Sanggenafa, 
Reni Shintasari, Ferinandus L. Snanfi: Assessing the Papuan Government’s Policy for Tackling the Spread of 
Coronavirus (COVID-19) 
The Current Post-Condition of Access 
Restriction Policy in Papua
In April, the Papua Government has 
changed its response four times when 
dealing with the spread of COVID-19: 1) The 
Instruction of the Governor of Papua No. 1 
of 2020, concerning Infection Prevention and 
Countermeasures of the COVID-19 in Papua 
Province; 2) The Decree of the Governor of 
Papua No. 188.4/121/2020, concerning the 
Establishment of Infection Prevention and 
Countermeasures Task Force of the COVID-19 
in Papua Province; 3) The Circular Letter of 
the Governor of Papua No. 440/3234 /SET on 
16 March 2020, concerning Concrete Steps 
in efforts to Prevent and Countermeasures 
the COVID-19 Infection in Papua Province; 
4) The Emergency Response announced in 
the Papua Joint Statement on 24 March 2020. 
However, it must be acknowledged that the 
war against COVID-19 is no easy matter – by 
the time the positive cases of COVID-19 have 
been discovered in Merauke on 22 March, some 
people are still being treated while others have 
recovered or died– as illustrated in the chart 
below:
Overall, it can be clearly seen that the 
Papuan’s number of positive COVID-19 
patients increased over the period of 40 days. 
In the fourth week of March (22th– 31st), the 
number of COVID-19 patients testing positive 
was still relatively low with below 15 cases, yet 
the  number then rose dramatically during the 
period of April which was almost 210 reported 
cases. This positive upward trend was followed 
by the category of recovered patients starting 
Figure 2. 
Comparison between positive, recovery, and death of patients with COVID-19 
in Papua Province from 22 March to 30 April 2020
Source: Collected by the authors from ‘Satgas Pengendalian Pencegahan Penanganan COVID-19 
Provinsi Papua (2020)
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on 01 April; however, the gap between positive 
and recovered patients remained very large at 
the end of April, where the number of positive 
cases was almost four times the number of 
recovered cases. Meanwhile, the number 
of confirmed deaths of COVID-19 in Papua 
remained stable with a total of 7 cases between 
10 March and 30 April.
 The positive upward trend of COVID-19 
cases in the figure above was also stated by 
one of the interviewees – Hasmi (46 years, 
female), a lecturer at the Faculty of Public 
Health, Cenderawasih University who has an 
epidemiological background. She found the 
following: 
“the COVID-19 cases in Papua were 
moving exponentially. The case 
moved at exponential rank numbers. 
So, the first week in Papua– 1 positive 
case infected 0.14. In week ten, it 
infected 3.3 people per day. The 
trend moved exponentially. From 
the proportion number we ranked 
the fourth position throughout 
Indonesia with a prevalence rate. 
This number was high; several 
regencies had reached 308/100,000 
population. In Papua, there was no 
sign of stopping or slowing down 
so far.” (personal communication, 
5 May 2020). 
Indeed, there are many factors which 
can contribute to the increasing number of 
positive cases of COVID-19 in Papua. Apart 
from the limitations of diagnostic tests and 
other factors, TW (29 years, female) and no-
name (28 years, male) who worked as doctors 
in hospitals in Biak Regency and Jayapura City 
maintained that the patients/suspects, in certain 
circumstances, did not provide a frank and 
honest answer related to their travel history 
and the people they met, so that it became a 
challenge for them to break the chain of the 
COVID-19 transmission. They even had to 
ask repeatedly in order to obtain accurate 
information (personal communication, 6 May 
2020). From a total of the 29 regencies/city in 
Papua Province, there are 12 regions that have 
COVID-19 cases, as follows:
The current situation prompts regency 
and city government to take large measures 
to reduce the COVID-19 transmission rate in 
Papua. Based on the observations, for example, 
Jayapura City through the Task Force for 
the Prevention and Handling of COVID-19 
conducted a rapid test on 30 April 2020 for 
all vegetable sellers especially those who ride 
motorbikes and cars to sell their vegetables, in 
which five merchants were declared reactive to 
COVID-19 and must undergo self-quarantine 
Table 1. 
Update COVID-19 Provinsi Papua between 22 March and 30 April 2020
No Regency/ City Positive Hospitalised Recovered Died PDP ODP
1 Mimika Regency 64 50 11 3
2 Jayapura City 44 21 20 3
3 Jayapura Regency 36 25 10 1
4 Nabire  Regency 16 16 0 0
5 Merauke Regency 13 5 8 0
6 Keerom Regency 10 8 2 0
7 Biak Regency 9 9 0 0
8 Sarmi Regency 4 1 3 0
9 Jayawijaya Regency 3 1 2 0
10 Mamberamo Tengah Regency 2 1 1 0
11 Boven Digoel Regency 2 2 0 0
12 Supiori  Regency 2 2 0 0
Total 205 141 57 7 270 1.827
Source: Satgas Pengendalian Pencegahan Penanganan COVID-19 Provinsi Papua (2020)
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as well as taking PCR tests by using swab 
checks (see also “Cegah COVID-19”, 2020). 
The similar action was also implemented on 
24-27 April in Mimika as the region with the 
highest number of positive cases of COVID-19 
in Papua Province as of April, where there 
were 145 residents reactive to COVID-19 
from the whole total of 560 residents that 
conducted rapid tests (“560 Orang Jalani 
Rapid Test”, 2020). As PT Freeport Indonesia 
(PTFI) operated in the region, PTFI had also 
stopped purchasing or ordering flight tickets 
to Timika for employees, contractors and 
family members who would come to the PTFI 
project area with commercial airlines. This was 
done to support the Regent’s instruction in 
dealing with the spread of COVID-19 (Jatmiko, 
2020). In Jayapura Regency, the government 
prepared 1,000 rapid tests for the community 
living around Sentani market. The government 
has also limited the activities of residents; 
specifically for supermarkets, shops, mini 
market, and restaurants – business as usual is 
only allowed from 08.00 am to  2.00 pm, as well 
as the Pharaa Sentani Market which is restricted 
between 06.00 am and 2.00 pm (“Aktivitas 
Masyarakat Dibatasi”, 2020; Muhsidin, 2020).
The Impacts and Challenges of Access 
Restriction Policy to Papua
A different style of decision-making 
would certainly have different consequences. 
These consequences are highly related to 
policy implementation that deals with actions, 
programs, and regulations. In this context, 
it could be argued that Papua government 
adopted the bottom-up approach to policy 
decisions in response to COVID-19 prevention. 
Yet, it has far-reaching implications on the 
people’s lives including social, economic, and 
cultural aspects. As stated by Septinus Saa (52 
years, male), Dean of the Faculty of Social and 
Political Sciences at Cenderawasih University:
 “…The Papua’s government policy 
was an effective strategy….. the 
problem of COVID-19 was that 
people had to stay at home, so it could 
be said that the policy was just like 
‘The Simalakama fruit’ (‘jump from 
the frying pan into the fire’– a phrase 
which is often interpreted as the 
most uncomfortable circumstance 
occurs to a person / experiencing 
difficulties). In the context of Papua, 
it meant that the policy restricted 
people from staying at home 
while people’s activities related 
to eating and drinking. If they 
worked as civil servants or middle-
class business people, it certainly 
didn’t matter, but if they were low-
income families, this would be a 
problem because they made a living 
from their daily activities... Even 
though the government provided 
social assistance amidst ongoing 
COVID-19, it depended on how 
many people live in the house. 
It was also worth noting that no 
one knew when the COVID-19 
pandemic would end.” (personal 
communication, 7 May 2020).
 
Moreover, the restriction access policy 
also turns out to have a detrimental impact 
on medical staff as the frontline in combating 
the spread of COVID-19.  As stated by Apter E 
Patai (51 years , male), Chairperson of Papua’s 
POGI (Indonesian Association for Obstetrics 
and Gynaecology):
 “…Our medical personnel also 
received bullying and discrimination 
in the society. When the community 
knew that they were the doctors 
or nurses who were part of the 
COVID-19 team, certain people 
then became afraid and did not 
provide services. For example, one 
of our doctors, who wanted to put 
his clothes in a laundry service, 
accepted refusal. Similarly, the one 
who looked for food stalls also got 
refused. Even today there had been 
some parents of nurses who did not 
allow their children to return home, 
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thus the hospital had to prepare a 
temporary resting place for them.” 
(personal communication, 4 May 
2020). 
As of 14 April, there have been 2 doctors 
in Papua who tested positive for COVID-19 
(Costa, 2020). Yet, this figure could continue 
to increase in the months ahead, not only for 
doctors but nurses as well.
 The Papua’s government policy also has 
an impact on economic and cultural aspects. 
For example, based on our observation in April 
2020, the price of eggs in Jayapura city rose 
significantly. In the first and second week of 
April, the selling price of eggs in the Hamadi 
and Youtefa market surged up to 100%. This 
was mainly because the stock of household 
staples had decreased on the market. Some 
traders said that the selling price of broiler 
eggs which was previously about Rp 58,000-
60,000 per rack, increased significantly to Rp 
110,000 -120,000 per rack. This condition affects 
the purchasing power of the community who 
are generally from the lower class (working 
class) and still rely on agriculture as the main 
sector, not to mention the decline in Papua’s 
economic growth. Indeed, in the first quarter 
of 2020, Papua’s economy was minus 6.77% 
compared to the fourth quarter of 2019 (Zulkifli, 
2020), caused by a decline in production in 
Papua. This economic slowdown was much 
affected by the spread of the COVID-19 at the 
end of the first quarter of 2020. Apart from 
mining and quarrying which are the main 
sectors of economic income in Papua Province, 
other sectors  which include insurance, 
financial services, waste management have 
also experienced a slowdown. Perhaps this 
is because the government has refocused 
all budgets on responding to the handling 
of the Coronavirus, thus slowing down the 
performance and income of other economic 
sectors. Additionally, since the temporary 
shutdown of the RI-PNG border from January 
2020, Papua’s economic growth has decreased 
due to the closing of the Skouw market 
(opportunity lost), reaching IDR 4 billion per 
month (Bank Indonesia, 2020). 
 Meanwhile, from a cultural perspective, 
information regarding the prevention of 
COVID-19 was not equally disseminated to 
people in remote areas. In addition to problems 
of language, geographical condition and lack 
of internet access/ connection appeared to 
contribute to the communication problems. 
Papuans tend to live in groups and rarely use 
masks so this is a challenge to government 
policy during this situation. As stated by the 
Anthropologists at Cenderawasih University, 
Johsz Mansoben (72 years, male) and Handro 
Lekitto (51 years, male) that one of the challenges 
in a cultural perspective was the togetherness 
of the Papuans in every activity and they 
would find it difficult to change it in a short 
time – including shaking hands, gathering for 
birthdays, family meetings, and so on (personal 
communication, 26 April 2020).
 There are also challenges or criticisms. 
As stated by a lecturer of the Faculty of 
Medicine at Cenderawasih University, Gerson 
Andrew Warnares (33 years, male) related to 
the time restrictions set by the city/provincial 
government: 
“…Papua’s government instruction 
to limit economic activity especially 
store opening hours was not effective 
to eradicate the COVID-19.  This 
could bring a new cluster because 
many people would gather in one 
store based on operation hours. 
The government should have let 
the stores open as usual. The point 
was to limit the consumers; not the 
time. For example, if there were 500 
consumers who went shopping in 
a supermarket, they could then be 
divided into five groups with each 
entry was one-hundred consumers.” 
(personal communication, 5 May 
2020). 
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Another challenge in implementing the 
policy is also mentioned by one of the doctors 
(29 years, female) in Kepulauan Yapen regency 
– an area with no confirmed cases of COVID-19 
at the time of writing this article. Even so, 
they still worked hard to prevent the virus 
from entering their island. She observed that 
although the airport and seaport were already 
closed, there were still speedboats that come 
from outside to their island and sometimes 
people were reluctant to provide information 
and coordination (personal communication, 
2 May 2020). This is also raised by Mansoben 
(72 years, male) from Cenderawasih University 
that: 
“Papua’s government policy to 
restrict access to entry by sea and 
air was correct, but we must also 
pay attention to the access through 
traditional routes (ferries)... Local 
traders between small islands in 
Papua must also be banned because 
their access via the coast and islands 
could be the cause of the spread 
of the virus from one region to 
another.” (personal communication, 
26 April 2020).
In addition to the problem of monitoring 
access to informal transportation, Papua 
also encounters the challenge of sending 
blood samples between regions during this 
devastating time as the airport closes. A doctor 
(37 years, male) from Merauke Regency said 
that Merauke did not have a proper health 
laboratory (Labkesda), thereby sending the 
samples (swab) to Jayapura, Makasar or Jakarta 
was the only way out. In addition, Merauke 
only counted on a military cargo aircraft 
(Hercules) with uncertainty in flight schedules 
as the airport closed at the moment (personal 
communication, 2 May 2020). In the next 
section, the authors will discuss the correlation 
between national policy regarding large-scale 
social restrictions (PSBB) towards provincial 
policy analysis.  
Discussion
Since  the  Governor  re leased the 
Papua joint statement in consultation with 
Forkopimda, regents/mayors, and other 
stakeholders on March 24, several points have 
basically been covered through Government 
Regulation No. 21/2020 on Large Scale Social 
Restriction (PSBB) as proposed by President 
Joko Widodo on 31 March. For example, article 
4 (1) points (b) and (c) states that ‘the PSBB at 
least includes restrictions on religious activities 
and restrictions on activities in public places 
or facilities’. This article has actually been 
implied in the Papua joint statement section III 
points (12) and (9) where it refers to ‘restricting 
various forms of worship activities for all 
religious groups who gather in large numbers, 
as well as imposing a time of community 
activity to meet basic needs and other activities 
in a limited manner from 06:00 am to 2:00 pm’. 
This topic was also found in interviews with 
three respondents (a doctor and two lecturers): 
Patai (51 years, male), EF (32 years, female), and 
Warnares (33 years, male) – who stated that 
Papua had already implemented PSBB prior 
to the policy (PSBB) issued by the President.
 Moreover, according to the circular letter 
from the Governor of Papua number 440/4170/
SET issued on 9 April 2020 concerning prevention, 
control, and countermeasures of COVID-19 in 
Papua Province, it was reported that the situation 
after 14 days of the enactment of the Papua 
joint statement, and in particular the restriction 
of airport access and ports throughout Papua, 
had far-reaching implications for stemming the 
spread of COVID-19. The Papua government, in 
this sense, has the ability to contain COVID-19 
cases whose sources came from outside Papua 
(imported cases) and now focuses more on local 
handling, namely tracking and mapping ODP 
(people under monitoring) and treatment to PDP 
(patients under surveillance) who are currently 
in Papua. 
 However, the issuance of Government 
Regulation No. 21/2020 on PSBB has resulted in 
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contradictions and illegality of policies which 
have previously been implemented in Papua. 
The Government Regulation No. 21 explains 
that the authority for determination of the PSBB 
status in a region, including restrictions on the 
movement of people and goods, resides with the 
minister who carries out government affairs in 
the health sector. This is achieved by taking into 
account proposals that meet the requirements 
or criteria applicable to article 3. Hence, it could 
be argued that Papua is currently implementing 
an ‘illegal’ policy because the Minister of 
Health has not yet officially determined Papua 
or its regencies/cities in PSBB. It is also worth 
noting that the criteria stated in Government 
Regulation No. 21/2020 on PSBB are not clear 
enough. For example, article 3 (a) states, ‘in 
determining whether a region can put in place 
PSBB measures, the total number of cases and/
or total number of deaths resulting from illness 
are increasing and spreading in a significant 
and swift manner to several regions’. However, 
this article does not explain in detail how many 
cases are required quantitatively in order to 
qualify a region in the status of PSBB. This is 
vital because, according to some Papuans, the 
number of COVID-19 cases has been quite high 
in the region (see figure 1). 
While the COVID-19 pandemic remains 
underway, the Papua government has at least 
adopted a stricter policy to protect its citizens and 
the region. To assess the Papuan government’s 
policy, the authors have selected the theoretical 
frameworks offered by Edwards consisting of 
four variables. The first of these variables was 
communication. Edwards and Sharkansky 
(1978:295) argued “The first requirement 
for effective implementation is that those 
responsible for carrying out a decision must 
know what they are supposed to do. Orders 
to implement a policy must be ... consistent, 
clear and accurate in specifying the aims of 
the decision-makers.” This means that the 
policymaker must clearly understand what he 
is doing and make sure that his/her instructions 
can be well interpreted by his subordinates. In 
the context of Papua Province, it could be said 
that even though the policy has been formulated 
at the provincial level, communication between 
the governor and regent/mayor  remains poor. 
This was conveyed by Ferry Kareth (66 years, 
male), an academic from the Faculty of Law 
Cenderawasih University, who stated that 
“There needs to be more serious coordination 
between the provincial and regency/city 
governments in combating the spread of 
COVID-19 in Papua. The decision-makers 
in every region must play an active role in 
communicating and cooperating to break 
the chain of the virus transmission”(personal 
communication, 2020, 3 May). The results of 
this ineffective communication, for example, 
can be seen in the difference in time restrictions 
between the provincial and city governments. 
Despite the deadline set up by the Governor 
at 2:00 pm for community activities in meeting 
basic needs, the Mayor of Jayapura adopted a 
policy of allowing its citizens to perform these 
activities until 6:00 pm. This clearly shows 
the implementation of policies that need to be 
fixed.
The second proposed variable to analyse 
policy implementation is resources. According 
to Sarjono and Sulistiadi (2018), resources are 
divided into four elements namely human 
resources, budget, facilities, and policy 
instruments. The organizational structure of the 
Provincial Government of Papua has sufficient 
and competent staff, such as the expert staff of 
the governor and regional secretary, supported 
by assistants in the fields of government, 
economic affairs, public welfare, and public 
affairs. A Papua COVID-19 Task Force has also 
been formed by the government. Meanwhile, a 
2020 special autonomy fund for Papua remains 
quite large at Rp 5.86 trillion (Pemerintah 
Provinsi Papua, 2020). Health facilities in Papua 
are also adequate with the availability of 41 
public hospitals across 29 districts/cities in the 
region (BPS, 2020). Even so, only three hospitals 
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in Papua have been proposed by Jakarta for 
COVID-19 referrals, namely RSU Jayapura, 
RSU Nabire dan RSU Merauke (Mukaromah, 
2020). Papua also has one laboratory testing 
facility for COVID-19 disease located in 
Jayapura city. Finally, the policy instruments 
used by the Papua Province are the Instruction, 
Decree, and the Governor’s Circular as well 
as the Papua Joint Statement mentioned in 
the previous discussion. These four resources 
have shown that Papua is capable of handling 
COVID-19.
The third proposed variable is disposition. 
Every leader is expected to not only have the 
knowledge and capacity related to what they 
are doing, but they must also be prepared and 
willing to implement it effectively (Marume et 
al., 2016). In the context of COVID-19 in Papua, 
based on observations, interviews and literature 
studies, it is fair to say that all decision-makers 
both at the provincial and regency/city levels 
are working around the clock to break the chain 
of COVID-19 transmission. For example, Biak 
Numfor Regent, Herry Ario Naap, has asked 
his staff to order 2 units of swab specimen 
inspection equipment made in the United 
States and Germany for the cost of Rp 2 billion. 
According to Naap, the method of using 
rapid tests was considered to be inaccurate 
and, as a result, made people panic in certain 
circumstances; not to mention the length in 
shipping time to Jayapura (“Pemkab Biak Pesan 
2 Unit PCR Test”, 2020). The decision of the Biak 
Regent clearly demonstrates how willing and 
able he is in fighting COVID-19. 
The last variable is the bureaucratic 
structure. As previously explained, there are 
two main focuses, namely Standard Operational 
Procedure (SOP) and fragmentation (Cory et. 
al, 2017; Krisnajaya et al., 2019). Based on the 
information compiled by the authors, Papua 
COVID-19 Task Force has treated patients 
based on the procedure, including burying 
the deceased in accordance with the SOP, 
ensuring the complete medical supplies 
and the construction of a referral hospital 
for handling COVID-19 in accordance with 
national program standards. In the context of 
policy fragmentation, Papua government still 
needs to improve the way it works. Improving 
policy implementation includes the provision 
of social assistance that particularly target those 
affected by COVID-19. This occurred because of 
poor coordination between urban villages and 
the population service and civil registration 
regarding the data population. The difference 
in the agreement on hours of activity between 
regions which have open borders like Jayapura 
City and Jayapura Regency, has also resulted 
in confusion for the people living in these two 
areas. Another reason is that there has been no 
clarity on sanctions or specific rules for those 
who break the health protocols and hours of 
activity. This discouraged the security forces 
(TNI-Polri dan Satpol PP) from taking decisive 
action. In short, the bureaucratic structure 
has also helped support Papua’s government 
policy for tackling COVID-19 despite that some 
improvements are needed.
Conclusion
This study has examined stricter 
COVID-19 Papuan policy by restricting 
travel to break the spread of the COVID-19 
pandemic. Despite some challenges from the 
central government, this policy is deemed 
effective by Papuans to protect the region 
from the virus. Indeed, all respondents in the 
interviews agreed and appreciated the Papua 
joint statement to shut down the travels on 26 
March 2020. The policy not only helps reduce 
transmission and death due to COVID-19 
(see figure 2), but it also assists the work of 
medical personnel in focusing on handling 
local transmissions. In addition, Papua’s policy 
for closing travels has successfully helped the 
government map the situation in preventing 
the spread of COVID-19, as mentioned in the 
letter from the Governor of Papua number 
440/4170 / SET concerning prevention, control, 
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and countermeasures of COVID-19 in Papua 
Province. 
 The theoretical foundation used in this 
paper also confirmed the effectiveness of 
policy implementation even though some parts 
need to be improved. First, communication 
between the provinces, cities, and regencies 
has been well established, yet it still needs to be 
increased. Effective communication is crucial 
to adopt a similar policy and minimize the 
discrepancy in policy implementation between 
regions. Second, the Papuan government 
resources used to combat COVID-19 have also 
been effective; they include human resources, 
budget, facilities, and policy instruments. Third, 
the disposition to implement policies has been 
reflected by the leaders in these five regions; 
one striking example is Biak Numfor Regent 
Herry Naap, who ordered swab specimens 
from the United States and Germany. Last, the 
bureaucratic structure has also helped the way 
in which the Papua government delivered the 
policy. The Papua COVID-19 Task Force has 
conducted its tasks based on the SOP, while 
improving policy implementation of some 
programs in the context of fragmentation is still 
required by the Papua government. It should 
also be noted that although those five regions 
have reflected variations between one another 
in policy implementation, such as Jayapura city 
where business hours was different with others; 
Yapen  focused on dealing with traditional 
routes; Merauke with the difficulty of airplane 
access; Biak lacked swab test kits and plenty of 
traditional routes; Timika with the operation 
of PT Freeport made frequent travels to the 
region; they all have shown how the local 
government in Papua was doing the best they 
could to combat COVID-19.
This study offers several suggestions. 
First, a strong collaboration is needed between 
provincial and regency/city as well as central 
government. The expected collaboration 
particularly includes mutual agreement 
regarding the hours of activity between 
provinces and regencies/cities, effective 
coordination between the sub-district and 
the population and civil registry offices 
related to the provision of social assistance, 
and formal rules (legal sanction) for those 
breaking the rules. Also, Papua would be 
better off having an approval from the Ministry 
of Health to implement PSBB to break the 
chain of COVID-19 transmission locally. This 
policy has been successfully implemented in 
China, called ‘a joint response’ from central 
government to local communities (Xioaming, 
2020) where the capital city of Hubei Province 
– Wuhan– along with prefecture-level divisions 
and township-level divisions (equivalent to 
cities and regencies) all adopted the same 
regulations. Second, the need for refocusing 
the budget in order to increase laboratory 
testing, particularly in four regions with 
high case numbers which are geographically 
separated from one another, namely Mimika, 
Nabire, Merauke, and Biak. This has also been 
recommended by WHO (2020), stating that 
laboratory testing is an integral part of the 
strategy to mitigate the spread of new cases of 
COVID-19 in all countries. Third, strengthening 
the health system response to COVID-19 
including protection, health infrastructure 
improvement, and identification of ODP, 
OTG, and PDP through surveillance. Finally, 
simplifying the regulations and adopting an 
evidence-based policy.
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